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Berkeley Redux: Imagination as Ethical Power in Shelley’s “Mont 
Blanc” 
         The great instrument of moral good 
                                                                                  
is the imagination . . .—A Defence of Poetry. 
 
       And he carried me away in the spirit 
        to a great and high mountain . . .—Rev. 21:10. 
 
  
 The wind blew away the clouds hiding Mount Blanc’s massive peak 
before which Shelley stood looking up. He later described the 
scene in a letter: “The immensity of these aerial summits . . . 
suddenly burst upon the sight . . .” (Jones 497). The powerful 
event was soon followed by what Jerrold Hogle calls a 
“meditative lyric” (“Shelley,” 111) named for the mountain. 
Although an ode, the poem (1817) is neither an ode to nor an 
apotheosis of the alp. In fact, the actual Mont Blanc is 
rendered in the poem mostly as abstract generalization. In the 
third and fifth sections it is “seen” impressionistically, and 
again in the third its voice is the subject of a single 
apostrophe. The bulk of physical description in the poem 
concerns the river Arve, its ravine and associated caverns, and 
the surrounding landscape, including the lesser mountains. These 
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scenes or “seens” are all virtually hypothetical, that is to 
say, imaginary. The mountain of the title, if not exactly 
erased, is conspicuously absent from the work. What, then, is 
the subject-matter? There has been a large amount of commentary 
on this poem, judged by C. E. Pulos to be “a key work to the 
understanding of the mature poet’s philosophy” (63)1; and, 
according to Frances Ferguson, “Critics seem to have agreed on 
one thing about Mount Blanc—that it is a poem about the 
relationship between the human mind and the external world. 
After that, the debates begin . . .” (202). In my own reading, 
the debate should begin before that, since the poem’s central 
concern may be shown as regarding the imagination as a 
therapeutic agency, a concomitant of its articulating a 
functional relationship between the human mind and the divine 
mind that borrows from George Berkeley’s idealism; thus the 
locus of the poem’s vision is empyrean rather than alpine. 
Shelley’s initial abjuration of Berkeley was succeeded, in Mary 
Shelley’s words, by his becoming a “disciple of the Immaterial 
Philosophy of Berkeley,” a discipleship that, “. . . gave unity 
and grandeur to his ideas, while it opened a wide field for his 
imagination” (Ingpen and Peck, V, “Mrs. Shelley’s Preface to 
Essays, Letters from Abroad” ix; hereafter cited as CW.). In 
this poem the immaterialism of Berkeley provides both an 
epistemological starting point and a framework for Shelley’s own 
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idealism, even as he rejects some of Berkeley’s theological and 
epistemological conclusions. In “Mont Blanc” the applications of 
this philosophy are humanistic, having two distinct but 
complementary expectations: the enrichment of aesthetic endeavor 
and the promotion of ethical amelioration, each to proceed from 
individual imaginative experience. I hope to show that the poem 
realizes its aim by postulating a unified view of life with all 
phenomena under the control of a single conscious power, a unity 
that in turn provides a positive sense of universal self-control 
for mankind. 
Though generally acknowledged to be an important work, “Mont 
Blanc” has at times been treated as a flawed statement, 
internally troubled and concluding—literally—with lacunate 
uncertainty. The presumed disjunctive instability of its five 
numbered sections has frustrated analysis. As Hogle puts it, 
“The reader of ‘Mont Blanc’ is . . . tossed perpetually between 
strict order and total chaos, centering and decentering, 
recurrence and irregularity, tradition and revolution, or 
sameness and difference in choosing the best assumptions by 
which to interpret what ‘comes down in likeness’ toward the vale 
of Chamouni” (Shelley’s Process 83). If indeed the assumptions 
we choose to honor enhance our understanding of a work, I have 
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found that by illuminating the philosophical context Shelley is 
valorizing, the poem’s rifts may load with ore of new meaning. 
 Although “the dominant trend of Shelley criticism has been 
toward establishing the coherence, consistency, and originality 
of [his] thought” (Roberts 129), Shelley’s dynamic intellectual 
development has at times engendered a willing suspension of 
belief toward the validity of his ultimate philosophical 
position in both his theory and his practice, represented, in 
the present poem, by three enduringly influential studies of 
“Mont Blanc.” In each case, the most damaging (damning?) 
assessment concerns the poem’s ending: 
 1) I. J. Kapstein posits a disjunction between what he sees as 
the poem’s climax (lines 139-41) and its conclusion (lines 142-
44) created as a result of contradictions and shifts in logic. 
Shelley’s “evasions, equivocations, and ambiguities” inevitably 
perform another (pseudo-) “climax,” “the ambiguous and ironical 
anticlimax of ‘Mont Blanc’” (1047, 1057, 1060).2 
 2) Earl R. Wasserman asserts that by ending with “a question” 
rather than an “affirmation,” the poem exhibits “skeptical 
incertitude,” a merely poetical (or fictional) epistemology 
based on “an experience of trance and death-like dream” (238). 
 3) Lastly, John Rieder states that “[a]lthough the section’s 
final lines achieve a prophetic aura, the poet’s revelation 
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concerns, not a divine manifestation, but the very absence of 
such a presence; the experience is an anti-epiphany” (794).  
Here I propose a reading that replaces the surface chaos with 
order, incertitude with philosophical certainty, and, with 
reference the third study cited, anti-epiphany with a post-
epiphany to be seen in the poem’s final movement. This point can 
only be reached, however, by reinterpreting a central term in 
“Mont Blanc,” which I will come to momentarily. 
An epiphany suggests a divine manifesting, and though 
confessedly unreligious, Shelley is never irreligious, and it 
would be wrong to say he was not interested in religion per se. 
In his study of Shelley and therapeutic idealism Hugh Roberts 
calls him “an excellent biblical scholar  
. . . particularly fascinated by the figure of Christ” (83). In 
such essays as The Necessity of Atheism (1811), A Refutation of 
Deism (1814), and his fragmentary draft On Christianity (1817) 
we see the central place religion occupied in his thought. In 
the first of the three texts just mentioned, for instance, he 
writes: “. . . our knowledge of the existence of a Deity is a 
subject of such importance that it cannot be too minutely 
investigated . . .” (Murray 3; hereafter cited as PW). His 
unqualified recognition of divine power and his piety in 
speaking of God coincide with the epistemology developed in his 
poem: 
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We live and move and think, but we are not the creators of our 
own origin and existence, we are not the arbiters of every 
motion of our own complicated nature, we are not the masters of 
our own imaginations [i.e., not originators of the raw 
materials, the data, of them, as I take it]. . . .There is a 
power by which we are surrounded, like the atmosphere in which 
some motionless lyre is suspended, which visits with its breath 
our silent chords, at will. Our most imperial and stupendous 
qualities, those on which the majesty and power of humanity is 
erected are, relatively to the inferiour portion of its 
mechanism indeed active and imperial; but they are the passive 
slaves of some higher and more omnipresent Power. This power is 
God. And those who have seen God, have, in the periods of their 
purer and more perfect nature, been harmonized by their own 
will, to so exquisite a consentaneity of powers, as to give 
forth divinest melody when the breath of universal being sweeps 
over their frame. 
 (PW, “On Christianity” 251-52). 
 
 
 As the product of Shelley’s speculations into the nature of the 
real, the poem elaborates and rationalizes a radical 
epistemology to explain the relationship of reason and 
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imagination to a super-sensible reality. A Judeo-Christian 
biblical presence in this poem is palpable; yet ever wary of 
dogmatizing, Shelley has chosen the highly figured language of 
poetry over prose. What Monika Lee observes of Queen Mab applies 
here as well: “. . . Shelley uses rational language and 
affective language with and against each other in order to avert 
the dangers of language codifying rigid structures of thought . 
. . .” This allows to Shelley, “the bringing of reform without 
the institution of new dogma and the desire for spiritual 
reassurance in a world bound by history . . . ,” thereby 
[avoiding] “the authoritarian stance and the rigid 
logocentricism that can be implied by a belief in a strictly 
rational utterance” (172).  
While the poem develops in five sections, its overarching 
structure may be regarded as Attic, tripartite, and odic, the 
first section—mostly—a (curtal) strophe of choric-like 
exposition; sections II through IV an antistrophe, both choric 
and individual in character; and section V an epode, furnishing 
a progression from collective commentary to individual response 
and circling back to the collective. An inexplicit if not 
exactly suppressed correspondence with classical tragic form may 
also be felt, providing a similar choric bracketing: following 
the prologue an actor speaks to the central “question” and 
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describes his/her anagnorisis/regcognition/epiphany, the exode 
providing closure, thus achieving a confluence of poetry and 
theater. Such a structural shadow here seems instinctively 
apropos, as “[t]he drama,” writes Shelley in the Defence, is 
“that form under which . . . the connexion of poetry and social 
good is more observable” than in other forms, particularly in 
“tragedies of the Athenian poets” reflecting as a mirror “the 
internal type of all that [a spectator] loves, admires, and 
would become” (521; 520). The five sections may be sketched as 
follows: 
 I (1-11). Opening syncretic statement contrasts the epiphany 
with the pre-epiphany.  
 II (12-48). Pantheism, deism, and dualism3 rejected; human and 
divine collaboration affirmed; nihilism denounced. 
 III (49-83). A clarified view of nature awakens man from mental 
apathy, supplanting a regressive skepticism with “faith” in a 
betterment of the human condition. 
 IV (84-126). The destructive forces and moral stupor of a 
mythical world are contrasted with the sublime stillness of 
actual Power, rebuking the ice-bound distortion of an Eden 
destroyed. 
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 V (127-44). Imagination in the service of moral choice rejects 
mindless “vacancy” and opens the way to a renovated man and 
world. 
 The red wheelbarrow of the poem is its opening statement: the 
first nine words of “Mont Blanc”—the first line and a half, to 
the caesura—may be the poem’s most important, a choric 
declaration of ontological truth deserving close examination. 
  
The everlasting universe of things  
 Flows through the mind, . . . (1-2)4 
 
The term which will determine the poem’s direction is mind. 
Because that which is “everlasting” or eternal must be divine 
not human, the designated context of all things is also divine—
the “things” being the thoughts of a supreme, conscious being. 
Etymologically, universe means “turned toward [the] one,” 
establishing the unitary character of noumenon/phenomenon, a 
mind’s exclusive awareness of its own activity, its thingness of 
expression. “By the word things,” writes Shelley, “is to be 
understood any object of thought . . .” (SPP, “On Life,” 508). 
With this, Berkeley concurs; for while things has a resonance as 
being “of the earth, earthy,” the term has an equivalence for 
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him with ideas (as well as being metrically more congenial to 
Shelley’s line): “The ideas imprinted on the senses by the 
Author of Nature are called real things . . .” Berkeley’s 
statement continues, making a hierarchical distinction between 
sense and imagination: “. . . and those excited in the 
imagination . . . are more properly termed ideas, or images of 
things, which they copy and represent” (Luce, A Treatise 
concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, II 33; hereafter 
cited as Works and Principles. References to Berkeley’s writings 
are by section numbers, except for Three Dialogues, where they 
are by page number.) Berkeley’s points elsewhere are germane: 
 
 I own the word idea, not being commonly used for thing, sounds 
something out of the way. . . . [I]t is now commonly used by 
philosophers, to denote the immediate objects of the 
understanding. . . . [T]here are only things perceiving, and 
things perceived; . . . every unthinking being is necessarily, 
and from the very nature of its existence, perceived by some 
mind; if not by any finite created mind, yet certainly by the 
infinite mind of God. . . . I am not for changing things into 
ideas, but rather ideas into things. . . . (Works, II, Three 
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous 235-36, 244; hereafter 
cited as Three Dialogues).  
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 Following upon this powerfully concentrated declaration a 
supersubtle change takes place halfway through line 2, the 
strophe having yielded to an antistrophe now voicing relative 
truth, doing so to the end of the fourth section. This 
syncretical shift to a (roughly) parallel material “universe” is 
an augmentation of the poem’s opening statement: the universe 
exists as an energetic flow of ideas, a fluid, fluent energy 
that  
 
 rolls its rapid waves, 
 Now dark—now glittering—now reflecting gloom— 
 Now lending splendour, . . . (2-4), 
 
imparting (lending) its own progressive mental development to 
its creation (“things”). Reflecting, in the sense of restful 
thinking, if understood as governing all three attributes in 
line 3, reveals a dynamic intelligence whose visual properties 
comprise a spectrum of light waves in a metaphorical 
representation of the entire range of aesthetics (“splendour”): 
darkness, brightness, and mixed light (gloom related to 
gloam/gloaming, the “glow” of sunrise or the twilight of sunset 
[OED]). The repetition of now—four times—emphasizes the 
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eternality of divinity, the ultimate source, which having 
neither past (beginning) nor future (ending) exists 
spontaneously in an eternal present.  
After a caesura in line 4 a mimetic universe is presented 
through simile: 
 
 . . . where from secret springs 
 The source of human thought its tribute brings 
 Of waters,—with a sound but half its own, 
 Such as a feeble brook will oft assume 
 In the wild woods, among the mountains lone, 
 Where waterfalls around it leap for ever, 
 Where woods and winds contend, and a vast river 
 Over its rocks ceaselessly bursts and raves. (4-11) 
 
This richly complex segment of section I re-presents the pre-
epiphany, the received, common philosophical context out of  
which the poem emerges, placed before the reader in order to 
expose the ambivalence of the human mind regarding its own 
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capacity to create as well as destroy, imagistically relying on 
the essential points of Berkeleyan idealism: BecauseI know only 
myself and my experience, it follows that all things are really 
my ideas, including what I perceive as my fellow-men and my 
sense of God. Yet, as my perception is ultimately passive, my 
sense-data being based upon the involuntary, unwilled “things” 
of experience (“imprinted” on my mind by God, according to 
Berkeley’s copy-theory of epistemology), I am forced to admit a 
creative source other-than-myself. As Berkeley writes: 
 
 Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every 
other object of the senses, are only so many sensations in their 
minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, 
doubtless they would never fall down, and worship their own 
ideas; but rather address their homage to that eternal invisible 
Mind which produces and sustains all things. (Works, II, 
Principles, 94)  
 
 This section of the poem may indeed seem epistemologically 
ambivalent if “mind” is interpreted as being that of a human. 
For the universal creative source itself Shelley uses a variety 
of terms at different points, the two used in “Mont Blanc” being 
Power and Mind (the second term being capitalized in this 
discussion to distinguish it from human mind), respectively the 
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potentiality and intelligence of immaterial divine causation. As 
the activity of a mind is to think, thinking implies ideas about 
which to think. A divine Mind is the creator or source of its 
ideas, endogenous; a human mind thinks about the things which 
come to it, essentially unbidden. Thinking to self-sourcing Mind 
is creating or willing; thinking to human mind is solely 
reasoning (in tandem with imagining, in Shelley’s view), even 
when called willing. In human idealism, acting must also be a 
form of thinking, making the mind appear to be creative: the 
human mind does “create” structures, ideational or material, 
through rearrangement of perceived things, and, with regard to 
life-forms, can procreate and (apparently) annihilate—making it 
seem to be an originator or a “source” of its own “thought.” But 
since to the human mind those things comprising its sense-data 
are recognized as involuntary, unwilled, a recognition of 
ultimate passive dependency can never be far behind: as the 
rapid waves of actual thought are rolling in a veiled where, a 
locus divine, the true source of the “source” (5) is the divine 
Mind, with all real thoughts (things) deriving ultimately from 
the flowing energy of the divine spring, or potential, of 
itself. The splendor, however, is only lent, not shared. The 
perceived springs of the real source are “secret,” not 
understood by and invisible to the human mind, which here in 
consequence acts in mimesis as an hypothesized “source” of its 
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own activity, figuratively rendered as water. If such a stream 
were to be regarded pantheistically as a tributary, the tribute 
being brought would necessarily be Other-directed, in 
acknowledgement of a supposed power-share with an archetypal 
mind existing in another realm or state of being. Yet, 
inherently aware of its own greatness, the actual source must be 
exclusively and inevitably Self-tributizing in fullness of 
power; thus, following a dramatic pause, a stumble of 
ambivalence (l. 6), the present tribute is described as an aural 
event of mimicry, a symbol of activity expressed in 
understatement as being “but half its own”: the enfeebled half-
sound of “tribute” (5) is the human mind’s self-directed 
gesture, a self-ironizing bathos. Such a subversion (sub-
version) fits Shelley’s object in this poem, which involves 
discrediting an epistemology that regards the human mind as an 
autonomous creative and destructive agency. 
 The anxiety of dualism is now depicted in the metaphor of a 
fluvial binary, the inferior flux feebly passive to the other’s 
bursting and raving in an implicit indictment of an hypothetical 
deistic source of inherent indeterminacy expressing itself in 
chaos—a self-absorbed, unstable deity of cruelness and 
capricious indifference to depredation and depression. 
Uncomprehending of any functional relation to its divine source, 
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human thought is rendered in an extended simile (“Such as”): a 
brook shown pathetically anemic through juxtaposition with a 
vast river that produces contending—rather than flowing—things. 
For Berkeley communication between the two “conscious” states of 
Creator and created is uni-directional, strictly a result of 
God’s imprinting activities and selectively occurring de-veiling 
acts of omniscience. In the poem Shelley’s elaboration of this 
connection will serve to bring moral empowerment to man: by 
emphasizing the epistemological ambivalence concerning the 
source of human thought Shelley’s poem sets the stage for 
examining more closely an actual functional relationship between 
the two “minds”—the one powerfully creative, the other passive—
which will be the task of the second section. In addition, the 
extended and entirely naturalistic simile involving mountain 
streams has served to reintroduce the sublime landscape evoked 
by the title, necessary to the poem’s subsequent exposition, as 
well as to anticipate cannily the solitudes and vacancies at the 
heart of the poem through having the water gurgle “among the 
mountains lone” with presumably no one there to hear it. 
 In section II the raving of line 11 is reified and localized: 
 
 Thus thou, Ravine of Arve—dark, deep Ravine— 
 Thou many-coloured, many-voiced vale, . . . (12-13) 
 17 
 
 
In the previous section, Mind is an active intelligent principle 
whose contemplation of itself is expressed as a euphonious flow 
of subjective ideas. Here in a contrasting inversion, a ravine 
becomes a passive receptacle for a river of thought. As Ferguson 
has noted, the river over time in-fluences the ravine’s shape, 
and in turn the vale, although passive and recumbent (“thou dost 
lie,” 19), reciprocally imposes a design upon the streaming 
(46). In “On Christianity” Shelley would write, “God is 
represented by Jesus Christ as the [Power] from which or thro’ 
which the streams of all that is excellent and delightful flow: 
The power which models as they pass all the elements of this 
mixed universe to the purest and most perfect shape which it 
belongs to their nature to assume. . . . the fountain of all 
goodness” (PW 255; brackets in original). But this interaction is 
not strictly mutual: while the ravine has been semi-permanently 
modified, gravity inexorably recalls the water, exerting a 
leveling and straightening force upon it that thereby constantly 
returns it to an “archetypal” state—which in a sense it never 
really left. In this representation can be seen the interplay of 
human imagination and reality: the human mind is continually 
reacting to unwilled sense-percepts of life, which it 
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imaginatively alters, but never actually changes. The ravine 
will come to stand for the poem’s persona or individuated 
personality while the lesser concavities (“caverns,” 14) 
represent other persons (i.e., “Thou . . . many voiced-vale”), 
inferior in size to the persona as their existence/consciousness 
cannot be experienced directly by him/her but known only by 
inference, through what Berkeley calls notions or the use of 
“reason” (Works, Principles, II, 89). Each, having responded 
individually to the water pressure, has an individual shape, a 
unique consciousness formed as a “separate phantasy” (35).  
 Spiritual things flow “through” Mind, whereas the Arve, the 
symbolic source of material ideas, plunges “down,” 
gravitationally, in hypothetical deflection and interment of 
spiritual “Power”—an assumed interpenetration of the human by 
the divine requisite to an ontology of pantheistic dualism. A 
vicious ambivalence pervades: naturalistic climatic events 
resulting in either reduced flow (as in drought) or total 
stoppage (as in freezing) are ever potential threats. The 
assumed mixing of two disparate realms has a further price: the 
temporal ravine shows its age in encrustations of hoary pine 
trees lining its banks; and though sublimely picturesque these 
same trees will be crushed and strewn about when the formerly 
inspiring water becomes glacial ice, suggesting the destructive 
cyclical pattern fully developed in section IV. Moreover, in 
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undergoing freezing and cessation, unlike the ever-flowing true 
universe, this water further becomes a fluvial debasement of its 
original, a paradox of “icy Springs, stagnant with wrinkling 
frost” (Prometheus Unbound I: 62). This vale is the psalmist’s 
valley of the shadow of death where a break in the thought-flow 
implies death, the annihilation of consciousness, a state 
literally un-thinkable.  
 In the preceding section the real universe, being actually 
“secret” (invisible) was presented in a scant three and a half 
lines of verse, an abstraction of its qualities—for “the deep 
truth is imageless” (Prometheus Unbound II:4:116). 
Suppositionally monarchical, the Arve too has its inception in a 
“secret throne” (17), but only so because its origin above the 
clouds cannot readily be viewed and because of the improbability 
of any easy access to it. Here material nature is shown with 
strident edginess, being a place of “crags . . . and caverns” 
(14), whose “throne” is roughly “gird” with vacuous “ice gulphs” 
(17), from which the river comes “Bursting through” like 
“lightning” in a “tempest” (18, 19). Pine trees are found 
“clinging” to the ravine in a “brood” (20), birdlike but also 
depressed (and pining); “caverns” reverberate with the water’s 
“commotion” (30), a noise that is “loud” and “unresting” 
produced by a wearying “ceaseless motion” (14-23). Temporal, 
mutable trees are aging giants, “Children of elder time” (21) 
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swept by eolian winds in merely an “old” rather than eternal 
“harmony” (24). The “scene” is indeed “awful” (15) or 
disagreeable, a legitimate pun in Shelley’s day, in so many ways 
a departure from the ideal, and has a “strange” (35) effect upon 
the poet—the thought commenced in line 30 is bitten off in 33, 
the break marking an introspective turning: 
 
 Dizzy Ravine! And when I gaze on thee 
 I seem as in a trance sublime and strange 
 To muse on my own separate phantasy, 
 My own, my human mind, which passively 
 Now renders and receives fast influencings, 
 Holding an unremitting interchange 
 With the clear universe of things around; (34-40) 
 
 Although earlier the winds were personified in the act of 
quaffing the piney scents, the anticipated pathetic fallacy of a 
dizzy ravine is suddenly revoked: the scene is profoundly 
dizzying, a stone (to add a metaphor) in the pool of the poet’s 
consciousness, creating widening ripples of understanding, as 
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the poet—simultaneously—becomes this ravine, dizzied by the 
fullness of recognition. The mental state is not a literal 
trance, as the use of simile makes clear. Rather this is the 
moment in which the poet (the chorus reduced to its coryphaeus) 
begins to chronicle his/her epiphany, as in a self-reflection 
(the pronoun “I” only occurs in sections 2-4, the “narrative” 
portion of the poem, or argument) he/she gazes entranced “on 
thee” (his/her own soul or conscious self), muses on his/her 
“own separate” “human mind,” and acknowledges his/her symbolic 
identity as one understood to be “passively” participating in an 
eternal intercourse with a suddenly clarified “universe of 
things.” At this moment of heightened understanding, passivity 
here means only that the human mind is a receiver not a creator, 
and does not imply the apathy that will be so strongly described 
in section III. The separateness or distinction being elaborated 
is not that between human and human, between the poet’s 
consciousness and that of countless other mortal minds 
represented by the suppositional (i.e., known only through 
Berkeleyan notions) subaltern caverns, but between human and 
divine, the sculpturable and the unsculpturable—that which is 
eternally distinct from material representation since it exists 
entirely in a fourth dimension—together with the functional 
connection that exists between the two. In recognition of 
humanity’s inability to be intellectually self-sourcing, Shelley 
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makes a pointed devaluation of merely human pronominal 
individuation: 
 
 The words I, and you and they are grammatical devices invented 
simply for arrangement and totally devoid of the intense and 
exclusive sense usually attached to them. It is difficult to 
find terms adequately to express so subtle a conception as that 
to which the intellectual philosophy has conducted us. We are on 
that verge where words abandon us, and what wonder if we grow 
dizzy to look down the dark abyss of—how little we know.  
 (SPP, “On Life” 508) 
 
 In this connection, quietly at work on another level of this 
section are three significant terms germane to the epiphany and 
adjunctive to explaining the poem’s epistemology: veil, cave, 
and shadow. Discussing mankind’s inability to understand God, 
Berkeley writes: 
 
 It is said the faculties we have are few, and those designed . 
. . not to penetrate into the inward essence and constitution of 
things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it treats of 
things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at, 
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if it run into absurdities and contradictions; out of which it 
is impossible it should ever extricate it self, it being of the 
nature of infinite not to be comprehended by that which is 
finite. (Works, Principles, II, “Introduction” 2) 
 
 
Indeed, exalted thoughts, refractions of the pure light of 
divinity, expressed spectrally (or spectrometrically) as 
“earthly rainbows” (25) lead not to the merely metaphorical 
“waterfalls” (9) of the previous section but to “the etherial 
waterfall” (26; my italics), the unbreachable divide between 
mortal and immortal, whose flow veils “some unsculptured 
[unsculpturable] image” (27): functioning with literal 
ethereality, it conceals the actual idea of the divine Mind. In 
the Judeo-Christian tradition—a context impelled by the 
terminology, by a communing that involves a mountain, and by the 
reverential nature of the poem—while there are instances aplenty 
of spiritual inspiration, guidance, fulfillment, and the like, a 
profound substantive distinction exists between matter (“flesh”) 
and spirit, neither ever represented as subject to intermixing 
or, in the case of spirit, transmutation. The birth of Jesus 
Christ could be cited as an exception in which “the Word was 
made flesh” (John 1:14), although there is far from broad 
agreement on the literal meaning of the phrase. In Hebrews, 
Jesus’ “flesh” is referred to as a “veil” (10:20), validating 
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the traditional flesh/spirit distinction. Following his death by 
crucifixion “the veil of the temple was rent in twain” (Mk. 16: 
38), providing man with conceptual clarification of an 
everlasting universe of deific things. A rainbow is an important 
biblical symbol of divine compassion, as in God’s speech to 
Noah: “I do set my bow in the cloud, and it shall be for a token 
of a covenant between me and the earth” (Gen. 9:13). A covenant 
or contract is not the same as direct communication between two 
distinct realms of consciousness—“for there shall no man see me, 
and live” (Ex. 33:20)—but can imply an unveiling of purpose 
heretofore obscure. Isaiah expressly connects ascending thought 
with unveiling: “And he [God] will destroy in this mountain the 
face of the covering cast over all people, and the vail that is 
spread over all nations” (25:7). 16. “Lines Written in the Vale 
of Chamouni,” the poem’s subtitle, plays on vale/veil, since 
vale can also mean “world”; i.e., the physical world (or 
universe) of things misrepresents the spiritual reality. The 
poem’s monism concerns just such an unveiling of divine purpose. 
 Caves, like caverns, represent a vacuity or the absence of some 
thing or idea; shadows represent the supposition of an idea, one 
that is everlastingly exclusive (veiled in the ethereal). In 
analyzing Shelley’s use of these figures some concepts in common 
number theory may be applied, particularly since for him 
imagining as distinguished from reasoning is the 
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mind acting upon . . . thoughts so as to colour them with its 
own light, and composing from them as from elements, other 
thoughts, . . . considering them, not in their integral unity, 
but as the algebraical representations which conduct to certain 
general results. . . . Reason is to Imagination . . . as the 
shadow to the substance. (Defence 510-11) 
 
 For instance, an integer is a natural number (i.e., an element 
in the set {1, 2, 3, . . .}) including its negative counterpart. 
The common definition of number being “a sum of units”—a sum of 
“ones” (unum)—the natural number one possesses a special 
potentiality, providing a base for all other numbers, whether 
wholes, fractions, or negatives; in a sense, all numbers exist 
as suppositions concerning aspects of one: two, supposes one 
combined with itself; one-third, that two-thirds of one are not 
present; and zero, in an act of total erasure, that one does not 
exist. Thus ravines, “gulphs,”5 and caves stand for the “number” 
zero, total vacancy. Zero has its uses, however, and human ideas 
floating imaginatively “above thy [the Ravine’s, the human 
mind’s] darkness” (42) may settle “Where that [legions of human 
thought, 41] or thou [Mind] art no unbidden guest” (43), in 
Poesy’s cave of enchantment, or the faculty of imagination, 
thereby implying a basis for human aesthetic collaboration with 
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the divine, since “the office and character of a poet 
participates in the divine nature as regards providence, no less 
than as regards creation” (Defence 521). Berkeley seems to 
concur: “a beautiful idea” can only have proper “design” when 
“Providence doth . . . preside” in its formation and “[a] man is 
conscious that his will is inwardly conformed to the divine 
will, producing order and harmony in the universe . . .” (Works, 
III, Alciphron 11). A poem functions as a therapeutic, 
corrective activity. “. . . Poetry,” writes Shelley in the 
Defence “is a mirror which makes beautiful that which is 
distorted” [515]. 
 In monism, moreover, harmony is an everlasting principle; 
conforming to the “divine will” means perceiving real things 
with increasing clarity. Shelley states that “harmony” as 
distinct from mere “melody” is achieved not through lyre-like 
passivity but volitionally, “by an internal adjustment of the 
sounds or motions thus excited to the impressions which excite 
them” (Defence 511). The number “minus one,” while 
mathematically useful as a hypothetical vacancy, could not exist 
in the realm of the real—a merely hypothetical “thing” flowing 
through Mind—since it represents a denial (much as a brook’s 
half-sound does) of the one of divine unity or integrality, and 
therefore is in essence merely a supposition—metaphorically a 
shadow. In “Mont Blanc,” the passive human mind, or 
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consciousness, itself a shadow of the divine—being a thing in a 
state of attenuation much like a “feeble brook”—seeks “among the 
shadows [shadow-thoughts or shadows of thoughts]” (45) that pass 
through its cavity, “Ghosts of all things that are” (46; my 
italics), a “shade of thee [Mind]” (46), a “phantom” or “faint 
image” (47). When “the breast,” the source, “From which they 
fled recalls them,” recognition of ultimate and absolute cause 
is announced in the affirmation that “thou [Mind] art there!” 
(47-48). The “substance” of a shadow is in a state of continual 
recall, just as a cave exists as an instance of continual 
undermining, in both senses of that term. In ignorance of its own 
negative existence, the cave-consciousness rarely rises above 
its self-perpetuating distortions. In his Principles, Berkeley 
defines “Matter” as “an inert, senseless, unknown substance . . 
. entirely made up of negatives,” the perfect instancing of a 
“non-entity” (Works, II 68). Sense-data absorb all our reasoning 
and desires, he writes, “till intellect begins to dawn, and cast 
a ray on this shadowy scene,” leading us to “the true principle 
of unity, identity” and proving material things “to be but 
fleeting phantoms” (Works, V, Siris 294). Similarly Shelley 
argues that metaphysics is best employed in discovering the 
“source of negative truth; . . .” that is, “the ascertaining of 
what is not true . . .” (CW, “Speculations on Morals,” VII 71)—
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easier said than done perhaps, for “The caverns of the mind,” he 
recognizes  
 
 are obscure, and shadowy; or pervaded with a luster, 
beautifully bright indeed, but shining not beyond their portals. 
. . [i]f the passage from sensation to reflection— from a state 
of passive perception to voluntary contemplation [of the actual] 
were not so dizzying and so tumultuous, this attempt would be 
less difficult. (CW, “Speculations on Metaphysics,” VII 64; my 
italics)  
 
Berkeley associates dawning intellect with delight in nature: “. 
. . God seems to choose the convincing of our reason of his 
attributes by the works of Nature,” and the proper activity of 
the philosopher lies in “the searching after, and endeavouring 
to understand those signs [“this language,” in another 
manuscript—e.g., Mont Blanc’s “voice”] . . . by the Author of 
Nature” (Works, II, Principles 63, 66). 
 A shadow having no existence except as a negation, the 
“thoughts” formed in its cave—consciousness—are negatives as 
well. Like zero, a shadow has its uses. Reasoning inductively, I 
know my consciousness as a fact—in fact, it is the only one I 
truly have. It can have no idea(s) extrinsic to itself. Thus I 
can never directly experience “another’s” thought—human or 
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divine. Furthermore, consciousness, to be consciousness, must be 
conscious of something. That something is essential to it, or 
else it could not remain as consciousness. Therefore 
consciousness is a cause (actually so in the real, imaginatively 
so in the mimetic) as well as a fact, and presupposes an effect—
an expression or idea coterminous with itself. A mind is the 
subject of the conscious state, or consciousness; the idea does 
(performs) what consciousness is. As with the number one, an 
idea is fundamentally singular, though multiform in expression. 
A tulip is a single idea. If a field contains, say, 2,000 of 
them, each in some way individually distinct, the basal idea 
remains as tulip. If one imagines a bisected tulip, the original 
unitary concept is unaffected, whole. If in the womb of Poesy’s 
cave a poet, as shadow, produces or births an “original” poem, 
he or she is “seeing” its archetype, some individuated 
“splendor,” merely a mimetic, hypothetical act rather than an 
actual (and impossible) mind/Mind collaboration, for “Poets,” 
writes Shelley, are “those who imagine and express this 
indestructible order,” those “who draw into a certain 
propinquity with the beautiful and the true that partial 
apprehension of the agencies of the invisible world which is 
called religion” (Defence 512). 
By way of contrast Berkeley’s “spirits” (men), though likewise 
not the source of their own ideas, exist as individual beings 
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having “indivisible” “active” minds that not only perceive, but 
think, act, and (in a sense) will—in a seeming sea of 
independent parallel universes in common with other spirits 
(Works, II, Three Dialogues, 231-32). Shelley’s idealism differs 
from this, however, because existence to conscious self, as a 
shadow of the one divine Self, can only be singular, as he 
concludes:  
 
 [T]he existence of distinct individual minds similar to that 
which is employed in now questioning its own nature, is . . . 
found to be a delusion The words I, you, they are not signs of 
any actual difference subsisting between the assemblages of 
thoughts thus indicated, but are merely marks employed to denote 
the different modifications of the one mind. 
 
Of which “mind,” he adds, he is “but a portion” (SPP, “On Life” 
508). Although this portion (the poet) is a shadow and although 
inevitably any such “thinking” shadow is a distortion, and 
distorter, of its original, it yet shares with its archetype 
immunity from erasure, an important issue for Shelley to whom 
man is “a being of high aspirations . . . ” who “disclaim[s] 
alliance with transience and decay, incapable of imagining to 
himself annihilation . . .”; and who has “a spirit within him at 
enmity with change and extinction [nothingness and dissolution]” 
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(SPP, “On Life” 506; brackets show Shelley’s uncancelled 
changes). Tilottama Rajan’s comments on the “terrifying vacancy” 
experienced by “the Poet” in Alastor in relation to the role of 
Shelleyan imagination fit the present discussion: “Because the 
need to imagine an ideal arises only from the fact that this 
ideal is not possessed, because the imagination thereby posits 
its object as absent or even nonexistent, the imagination must 
enter its own nothingness to disclose the very reality that it 
seeks to transform.” She adds, “A troubling ambiguity about 
whether the source of vision is internal or external is of 
crucial importance here” (77, 78). “Mont Blanc’s” performed 
epiphany concerning the actual source of inspiration provides a 
resolving of the ambiguity, “Poetry,” and those who make it 
being “a mirror which makes beautiful that which is distorted” 
(Defence 515).  
 
 In Three Dialogues Berkeley’s surrogate Philonous designates 
persons by the oxymoron “finite spirits” whose “existence” 
begins when through divine decree they “become perceptible to 
intelligent creatures” in “a relative, or hypothetical existence 
. . .”; an epistemological position allowing him to imagine a 
concomitant hypothetical annihilation, as when straight-man 
Hylas asks: “Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive 
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it possible, that things perceivable by sense [the shadow of 
sense] may still exist?”, to which Philonous replies: “I can; 
but then it must be in another mind . . . wherein they exist, 
during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them: as 
likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my 
supposed annihilation” (Works, II 253; 230-31).6 Unlike a shadow, 
whose extinction cannot affect its archetype (Peter Pan’s 
trepidation notwithstanding), the annihilation of a real being, 
as a “portion” of a whole, would be an event of mental depletion 
inconceivable in an everlasting universal consciousness. Existing 
in mimesis, the activities of a shadow are as infinite as those 
of a divine original, with which it is “unified” though not 
through absorption. “The view of life presented by the most 
refined deductions of the intellectual philosophy,” Shelley 
writes with perfect literalness, “is that of unity [oneness]” 
(SPP, “On Life” 508). The concept of absolute unity, however, 
occasions Earl Wasserman’s deepest misgivings toward Shelley’s 
monism, since, he argues, “philosophic idealism tends to merge 
mind and universe totally. . . . Such an absolute Existence or 
universal Mind is neither a God apart from man nor an 
abstraction, but the unitary reality into which all apparent 
parts, distinctions, and relations dissolve” (140). Must they? 
In reality, effect can never become cause, nor phenomenon 
noumenon. Fear of fusion, or absorption, stems from the 
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hypothesis of separate parallel consciousnesses (universes), in 
which the greater is an ever-threatening subsumer of the lesser, 
causing its termination, an impossibility in the poem’s monistic 
ontology of infinite, eternal individuation, wherein the 
principle of oneness expresses itself through individuated 
things just as a tulip could be red, yellow, variegated; a human 
James, Sarah, Ernesto; and so on, ad infinitum, in unblurred 
uniqueness (no two tulips can be exactly alike, nor can a tulip 
ever become a cabbage, and so forth), everlastingly. The poet’s 
“human mind,” albeit a shadowed “phantasy,” is nonetheless 
“separate,” individual, having fulfillable purpose, as a result 
of the “unremitting interchange” it enjoys with creative Mind. 
Even though all such “shadows” are distortions they are not 
susceptible to annihilation (I remain unconcerned if someone 
treads on my shadow), and through “realignment” with their 
archetypes via the imagination (the bent oar in the water I 
understand to be actually straight) are capable of becoming 
enhanced representations of the truth, thereby invoking the 
faith of the third section. 
 
 Some say that gleams of a remoter world 
 Visit the soul in sleep, . . . (49-50) 
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 To Shelley there is no difference between dreams and the 
thoughts referred to as ideas (CW, VII, “Speculations on 
Metaphysics” 59). In the poem, the “dream” (55) that accompanies 
sleep is an ultra-distortion of an umbral existence, an utterly 
passive state of consciousness. In fact, “[h]uman life” itself, 
he writes, “with all its unreal ills and transitory hopes is as 
a dream which departs before the dawn leaving no trace of its 
evanescent hues” (PW, “On Christianity” 256). “Death” (50), an 
even more slumberous passivity, is the acceptance of the 
“theory” of annihilation, a caverna erasa—defined in Queen Mab 
as “The transient gulph-dream of a startling sleep” (IX:175; my 
italics)—that foists itself in the many “shapes” (51) it assumes 
upon waking, living beings. Rhetorical questions here yield 
meaning: the supposedly distinct states of “life and death” (54) 
are recognized as merely varieties of the same thing, as 
“omnipotence” (53) unfurls (i.e., upfurls; see Hutchinson 
533n53) the veiling ignorance separating them; and the I-human, 
by looking “on high” (52), in courageous “voluntary 
contemplation,” grasps the entrapping circularity of the entire 
mortal dreamscape. A speech in Hellas by Ahasuerus concisely 
conveys the same sense: 
 
 —this Whole 
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 Of suns, and worlds, and men, and beasts, and flowers 
 With all the silent or tempestuous workings 
 By which they have been, are, or cease to be, 
 Is but a vision—all that it inherits 
 Are motes of a sick eye, bubbles and dreams; 
 Thought is its cradle and its grave, nor less 
 The future and the past are idle shadows 
 Of thought’s eternal flight—they have no being. (776-84) 
 
 Though the “spirit fails” (57) in the presence of the epiphany, 
utter passivity abates and the broad mountainscape of Mont 
Blanc’s cold sterility reasserts itself, an objectification of 
speculative vacancies—“A desart peopled by the storms alone” 
(67). In “Ozymandias,” written about the same time (c. 1817), 
Shelley, preferring to avoid the tautological problem of an 
unpeopled desert, uses a perceiver as part of the sonnet’s 
frame, “a traveler” “Who said—” (1, 2). Here, however, taunting 
tautology by imagining emptiness, his only “witnesses” to a 
“Ghastly” (71) scene are an “eagle” (68) and a “wolf” (69), both 
merely hypothetical. To rhetorical questions on the geologic 
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birth of Mont Blanc, “none [no man] can reply” (75) since the 
event preceded his-story—another hypothetical vacancy leading 
not to the poem’s “climax,” of which there is none, but to its 
moral and literal center. Nature, epitomized in the “voice” (80) 
of the mountain (a sermon in stone), can conduct to either 
spirit-crushing a-theism (“awful doubt”) or epistemological 
clarity (“faith so mild” [77]), the latter having a 
reconciliatory function sufficient to begin a repeal of the 
“Large codes of fraud and woe” (81). The wing-clipping tendency 
of much prior criticism, I feel, has been a result of the 
reading of the large codes of fraud and woe line as merely 
referencing the topicalities one critic calls “the evils of 
contemporary politics and religion” (Leighton 68), rather than 
representing the tyrannizing determinism of personal 
annihilation, everlasting punishment, and theories of divine 
election—the last two being conspicuous in theologies of 
Shelley’s day and of ours, the inevitable consequence of 
(apparent) collective (large) amoral reasoning based upon 
uncorrected shadows of reality—perhaps symbolized in the (self-) 
destructive cycle of predation acted out upon man (here reduced 
to “some hunter’s bone” [68]) by eagle and wolf. 
 The practical implications of the vision turn on the function 
of the imagination. Berkeley and Shelley would both agree that 
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for any thing (and anything) to exist it must be perceived; that 
the human mind cannot create; and that the will of God is 
absolute (and, to Shelley, good, in contrast to Necessity’s 
moral neutrality in the Queen Mab days). “Mind,” Shelley 
declares, “as far as we have any experience of its properties . 
. . cannot create, it can only perceive.” (SPP, “On Life,” 508). 
In his Principles, Berkeley distinguishes between ideas—non-
thinking, passive, and inert objects—and spirits—active, 
thinking beings, the latter not themselves ideas, but “that 
which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them.” An 
act of creation is a willing for some thing to be; and since 
God’s “will constitutes the Laws of Nature,” it follows that 
“the whole creation is the workmanship of a wise and good 
agent,” the originator of “the final causes of things.” Yet 
Berkeley freely uses the term will as applied to humanity in the 
sense of its also being an “agent” serving solely for acts of 
imagination: “I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, 
and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no 
more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in 
my fancy: and by the same power it is obliterated, and makes way 
for another.” Although he possesses this power over his “own 
thoughts,” he has no volitional control over “ideas actually 
perceived by sense. . . .” In the same book he explains this: 
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 When in broad day-light I open my eyes, it is not in my power 
to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what 
particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so 
likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted 
on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some 
other will or spirit that produces them.” (Works, II, 89, 139; 
32, 107; 28, 29) 
 
For him, willing, in the human mind, is hypothesizing, applying 
“what if” reasoning, experiencing one’s life activities as a 
compound of imaginative performances, an entirely mental 
activity, an arranging of those “particular objects” including 
language that ultimates in situational constructs, susceptible 
either of being mediated internally or expressed in modes of 
virtual reality. Because God’s will is for each individual to 
promote “the universal well-being of mankind,” right reasoning 
must be guided by “conscience,” which is produced by 
“infallible” divine law (Works, VI, “Passive Obedience” 11,12).  
Yet Berkeley’s championing of conscience-governed free-will is 
often subverted by his determinism, as when certain unbidden 
percepts, such as distortions or abominations, contrary to 
mankind’s “well-being,” are to be tolerated: although “monsters, 
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untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in 
desert places, miseries incident to human life” all argue 
against a wise and good God, such “methods of Nature are 
absolutely necessary” to the workings of that “mighty machine” 
whose larger purpose is unperceivable to flesh and blood. This 
same God cannot experience pain; yet “all things” are known and 
understood by Him, including “what pain is, even every sort of 
painful sensation, and what it is for His creatures to suffer 
pain . . .” (Works, II, Principles, 151; Three Dialogues 240), a 
view wholly denied in aqueous metaphor by Shelley: “Thus much is 
certain, that Jesus Christ represents God as the fountain of all 
goodness, the eternal enemy of pain and evil: the uniform and 
unchanging motive of the salutary operations of the material 
world”; adding, “. . . it is foreign to [God’s] benevolent 
nature to inflict the slightest pain” (PW, “On Christianity” 
255). Imagination involves the agency of conscious choice, 
conceiving situations classifiable as amoral, immoral, or moral—
the latter two values implied in the biblical exhortation from 
Deuteronomy for a corrective vision: “See, I [God] have set 
before thee this day life and good, and death [“woe”] and evil 
[fraudulent “codes”] . . .,” which a few verses later is 
expressed in a juxtaposition as of one and minus one: “. . . 
life [+1] and death [-1], blessing [+1] and cursing [-1] . . .”; 
followed by the divine remedy: “. . . therefore choose life [+1, 
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one], that both thou and thy seed [your lifework] may live . . 
.” (30:15, 19). The pattern evokes Shelley’s own description of 
the imaginative process as being “algebraical.” 
 Neither the voice nor, in a secondary sense, the codes 
themselves, have been generally “understood” (81) by mankind; 
yet through the poem’s universalizing vision every individual 
hearkening to the benign will and motive behind the voice, has 
the moral capacity to become “wise, and great, and good” and 
“[i]nterpret, or make felt, or deeply feel” (82-83) the 
benevolence of creation—the triple task performed here, in fact, 
by the poet/philosopher of “Mont Blanc.” Seen this way, the poem 
becomes a statement of fruition of what Hugh Roberts calls 
Shelley’s “therapeutic idealism,” adding that such poets are 
 
interested in a complex of Christian motifs that are central to 
the more or less sublimated theology of the therapeutic 
imperative. One such motif is the search for grace identified by 
[Harold] Bloom, which implies both the desire for a sustained 
contact with a divinity, or Absolute, and our fallen condition, 
which renders that contact frustratingly inconstant; another is 
the apocalyptic accession to a new order that will heal our 
fallen and divided state, which many critics have detected in 
Shelley’s liberal borrowings from Revelations [sic].” (83)  
 41 
 
 Writing to Elizabeth Hitchner five years earlier, Shelley had 
vigorously stated that “perfection in morality appears now far 
removed from even the visionary anticipations of what is called 
‘the wildest theorist.’ I, then, am wilder than the wildest” 
(CW, VIII 131). A radical philosophy faces resistance. In 1817, 
speaking of the oratory of Jesus, who “[accommodated] his 
doctrines to the prepossessions of those whom he addressed,” 
Shelley felt that a reformer must use “[the] art of persuasion” 
(for him the universalizing aesthetic of poetry) so that his 
“judges 
 . . . should be free from those national and religious 
predilections which render the multitude both deaf and blind”; 
and that Jesus feared not to “[trample] upon all received 
opinions, on all the cherished luxuries and superstitions of 
mankind,” exhorting men to “cast aside the chains of custom and 
blind faith by which they have been encompassed from the very 
cradle of their being, and become the imitators and ministers of 
the Universal God” (PW, “On Christianity” 261-62). Conscience 
shares roots with consciousness, even to having the same meaning 
archaically; failure to exercise conscious moral choice calls 
forth God’s censure: “[M]y people have committed two evils; they 
have forsaken me the fountain of living waters, and hewed them 
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out cisterns [mental caverns], broken cisterns, that can hold no 
water” (Jeremiah 2:13). Finally, all inhumanity is human, not 
divine. 
 In 1 Kings the Lord, discovering the prophet Elijah hiding from 
pursuers in a cave of Mount Horeb, commands him to ascend the 
mount of vision for a view of reality:  
 
 . . . Go forth, and stand upon the mount before the Lord. And, 
behold, the Lord passed by, and a great and strong wind rent the 
mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord; but 
the Lord was not in the wind: and after the wind an earthquake; 
but the Lord was not in the earthquake; And after the earthquake 
a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire: and after the fire a 
still small voice.  
 (19: 9, 11-12) 
 
Similarly, un-Godly distortions of “lightning, and rain, / 
Earthquake, and fiery flood, and hurricane,” as well as an 
annual “torpor,” invest the mythical “dædal earth” (86-88) of 
mankind in the self-consciously flat first third of this fourth 
section. Man, ideally the “being of high aspirations,” is here 
entrapped in a dull, repetitive pattern of existence with 
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“things that move and breathe with toil and sound / Are born and 
die; revolve, subside and swell” (94-95). At this moment, 
nonsequentially, a powerful voice breaks in upon the mundane: 
 Power dwells apart in its tranquility 
 Remote, serene, and inaccessible: . . . (96-97) 
This expression of divine authority, uttered as a super-choric 
intrusion, its still tone resembling the voice heard by Elijah, 
serves to bring a corrective focus to the “adverting mind” (100)7 
of the poet, and the distortions inherent in the present 
mountainscape are understood to be erroneous resemblances of the 
real,8 known only through the senses but ratified, Berkeley 
notes, as “[a]ncient and rooted prejudices [which] do often pass 
into principles” that over time become “privileged from all 
examination.” Furthermore, he adds, “there is no absurdity so 
gross, which by this means the mind of man may not be prepared 
to swallow” (Works, II, Principles 124). Similar biblical 
episodes, such as the “voice out of the cloud” during the 
transfiguration of Jesus (Matt. 17: 5), also entail injunctions 
to correct one’s vision; as in Isaiah: 
 
 Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a 
highway for our God. Every valley shall be exalted, and every 
mountain and hill shall be made low: and the crooked shall be 
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made straight, and the rough places plain: And the glory of the 
Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together: for 
the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it. (40: 3-5; see also Luke 3: 
4-6) 
 
 The balance of the section describes the mountain as “a city of 
death” (105) that is “Yet not a city” (107) but a sterile self-
destructively violent misrepresentation of the actual, “a flood 
of ruin” (107) much ratified by “ancient and rooted” dogmas as 
symbolized by “dome, pyramid, and pinnacle” (104)—eastern, 
pagan, and western religion. In a distortion of the flowing 
universe, “glaciers” at the mountain’s top “creep / Like snakes 
that watch their prey” (100-01), Eden-serpents presiding over 
lost paradise9 (“So much of life and joy is lost” [117], and “The 
race / Of man, flies far in dread” [117-18]); while at the lower 
level where the Arve is in motion “vast caves” (120) of hectic 
negativity “Shine in the rushing torrents’ restless gleam” (120-
21) as the river “Breathes its swift vapours to the circling 
air” (126) of an endless dream.  
 The “restless gleam” of the preceding section is transmuted by 
the opening lines of this fifth section: 
 
 Mont Blanc yet gleams on high (127) 
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Paradoxically, though life flows, the nexus of Power symbolized 
by the mountain is serenely “still” (128), without “variableness 
[mutability], neither shadow of turning” (Jas. 1:17), ever 
present, even “In the calm darkness of the moonless nights” 
(130). Berkeley states, “[i]f we mean by things the sensible 
objects, these, it is evident, are always flowing; but if we 
mean things purely intelligible, then we may say on the other 
hand, with equal truth, that they are immoveable and 
unchangeable” (Works, V, Siris 349)—that is, the central 
stillness, the Power, the “still small voice,” of Mind itself. 
It is the “still and solemn power” that is behind the “many 
sounds, and much of life and death” (128-29) comprising the 
shadow that is human “existence”; and in mimicry, the human mind 
of man “is at once the centre and circumference” of its own 
cosmos (SPP, “On Life” 507). Returning to its central paradox, 
the poem affirms of the “many sights” (128) that might be 
imagined as occurring on Mont Blanc, “none”—that is, no human—
“beholds them there” (132). To imagine—make an image of—some 
thing is an act of reason not creation, for “mind cannot create, 
it can only perceive.” To imagine a tree falling noiselessly in 
an unpopulated forest is no less hypothetical than is picturing 
“voiceless lightning” (137) on a mountain’s peak. Whether one 
thinks of such “solitudes” (137) in pictorial images or simply 
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in linguistic terms, they are nonetheless equally imaginary 
constructs, neither assertions nor proofs “pure” vacancies 
exist. The shadow-man of Mind is alone able to indulge 
hypothetical (distorted) “thought”—as in Berkeley’s hypothesis 
of annihilation—because imagining (passive) is not the same as 
knowing (active): that which knows never speculates. To imagine 
vacancies is to perceive, “through a glass, darkly,”10 that which 
already exists, known to divinity as a divine construct. In 
discussing Shelley’s Intellectual Philosophy, Wasserman points 
out that in that system the “supposed entities” of “pure time or 
space cannot be perceived” (146). Such a judgment inadvertently 
supports Shelley’s position since both concepts are pure 
tautologies, the former a circumlocution for “eternity,” the 
latter an impossibility in idealism, because even what we might 
take for emptiness must be so conceptualized in a consciousness. 
The assumption that pure time/space can exist externally to and 
independent of conscious knowing is the very position “Mont 
Blanc” is refuting. “[A]bsolute space,” as Berkeley sometimes 
refers to it (here doing so in direct reference to its use in 
Newton’s Principia), is to him indeed a suppositional entity, 
purely an imaginative fiction: the concept of “pure space” is a 
“dangerous dilemma,” a belief “that there is something beside 
God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, 
immutable,” a notion that is “pernicious and absurd”; and 
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theologians as well as “philosophers of great note, have . . . 
in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space, concluded 
it must be divine” (Works, II, Principles 111; 117). Concerning 
philosophy, Shelley writes that it “has much work yet remaining 
as pioneer for the overgrowth of ages. It makes one step towards 
this object however [sic]; it destroys error, and the roots of 
error. It leaves, what is too often the duty of the reformer in 
political and ethical questions to leave, a vacancy” (SPP, “On 
Life” 507)—precisely what has been done at the poem’s 
conclusion: an hypothesized vacancy has been left to be 
evaluated within the context of the poem’s epiphanic 
epistemology11: 
 The secret strength of things 
 
 Which governs thought, and to the infinite dome 
 Of heaven is as a law, inhabits thee! 
 And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea, If to the 
human mind’s imaginings  
 Silence and solitude were vacancy? (139-44) 
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 The concept of a pure vacancy, like that of a pure space, 
conjectures an effect without a cause—something literally 
unsubstantiated. By contrast, in an all-encompassing monism, a 
product of imagination is linked to primal cause. Here, imagined 
vacancy stands in the relation of zero to number one, because 
here “thee” is the mountain of sense, ostensibly sublime, 
replete with hypothetical “solitudes,” but nonetheless a shadow 
of an archetype inhabited (constituted) by invisible divine 
law.12 A sphere is the symbol of perfect, self-contained Mind, 
which as divine cause (noumenon) is represented as a dome or 
hemisphere eternally completing itself in the everlasting flow 
of effect (phenomenon).13 In line 142, the poet looks through the 
material mountain to its creative source: “thou,” or Mind. To 
assert that “thou” is Mont Blanc as Wasserman does (238) is to 
accept an illogical sequence—since a mountain is, finally, no 
more than earth—big earth indeed, yet still subject to 
geological recession—that forces a reading of earth-earth-stars-
sea. The rhetorical question plainly affirms that if imagined 
silences and solitudes were devoid of any existence, then 
thou/Mind and its cosmic shadow (earth-stars-sea) would be too. 
The phrase silence and solitude invites two complementary 
readings, first as used in a relative sense to imply qualities 
of quiet and peace—commonly, peace and quiet—twin aspects of 
sought tranquility that have ever been within the reach of 
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humanity broadly and often depicted in and as aesthetic themes. 
Such balm exists because pure vacancy does not exist. Where it 
is believed to exist the same concepts become distorted into 
religious “codes” that “gleam” in broken cisterns and validate, 
for instance, a range of hypothetical evils.  
 “Mont Blanc,” far from being the record of a “trance and death-
like dream,” is Shelley’s poem of dream-denying pure reason 
based on “[t]he most refined abstractions of logic” that 
develops an ontology, “which, though startling to the 
apprehension . . . strips . . . the painted curtain from this 
scene of things” (SPP, “On Life” 506). Shelley believed there to 
be a “true solution of the riddle” of life (CW, III, “Shelley’s 
Notes on Hellas” 56); though, according to Cameron, his “own 
efforts to solve [it] had been in vain” (157), a judgment 
disallowed by a thoughtful monistic reading of the poem. This is 
a poem with a moral center that challenges materialism’s 
“shocking absurdities of the popular philosophies of mind and 
matter” (SPP, “On Life” 506) that Shelley found so detrimental 
to humanistic principles. Looking “on high” and accepting the 
undecaying goodness of the universe as the fact and evil and 
annihilation as the dream provides a powerful impetus to 
individual self-correction; for before “Love [burst] in like 
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light on caves,” as Shelley writes in Prometheus Unbound, “Man,” 
had been  
 
 a many-sided mirror 
 Which could distort to many a shape of error  
 This true fair world of things,” 
but is now beheld as an individuated being, a portion of “a 
chain of linked thought, / Of love and might to be divided not,” 
that is, neither divaricated (“oh, not men!”) nor fragmented 
(“one harmonious Soul”); Man, who consciously exercises through 
conscientious choice a “nature” that “is its own divine 
controul,” and to whom “all things flow . . . as rivers to the 
sea”; renovated Man to whom  
 Labour and Pain and Grief in life’s green grove 
 Sport like tame beasts—none knew how gentle they could be!  
 (IV, 355, 382-84, 394-95, 400-02, 404-05)  
 
Speaking of the foregoing poem, Donald Reiman says that “[g]iven 
Shelley’s ethics and his theory of knowledge (epistemology), it 
seems likely that he believed that when human beings viewed the 
 51 
universe correctly, it would appear to be beneficent rather than 
hostile” (SPP, 203). A changed perspective can provide more than 
just a rosy view. As “wise” men, Berkeley advises,  
 
 [w]e should propose to our selves nobler views, such as to 
recreate and exalt the mind, with a prospect of the beauty, 
order, extent, and variety of natural things: hence, by proper 
inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and 
beneficence of the Creator: and lastly, to make the several 
parts of the Creation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the 
ends they were designed for, God’s glory, and the sustentation 
and comfort of our selves and fellow-creatures.  
 (Works, II, Principles 109) 
 
An ontology based on unity expressed through individuation 
repudiates hierarchy through the inevitability of unique 
difference in all “things,” including people. The “gifts” 
possessed by individuals and the negotiated contexts in which 
the gifts are allowed fullness of expression—in other words, the 
enthroning of liberty as a life-principle—form the basis of an 
all-encompassing fairness doctrine.14  
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 Shelley remarks with approbation the affirmations of Greece’s 
“most eminent” philosophers concerning “[t]he universality and 
unity of God, the omnipotence of the mind [i.e., the noumenon] 
of man, the equality of human beings [as individuations of the 
One] and the duty of internal purity [conscience] . . .” (PW, 
“On the Doctrines of Christ” 273). “Mont Blanc” implies that the 
world can become progressively bettered through the conscious 
practice of ethical choice. “Poetry,” Roberts points out, “was 
one of the principal ‘therapeutic’ tools by which the Romantic 
reengagement with the world was to be achieved” (49). With his 
deep distrust of organized religion Shelley would be 
understandably cautious of promoting his views in prose as 
tenets of any kind: “An established religion turns to deathlike 
apathy, the sublimest ebullitions of most exalted genius, and 
the spirit stirring truths of a mind inflamed with the desire of 
benefiting mankind” (PW, “On the Doctrines of Christ” 273).  
 It may have been Shelley’s hope to reach through this 
epiphanous poem, in the words of Berkeley, “only a few 
speculative persons”; that philosopher continues, expressing a 
sentiment that, I feel, Shelley would have approved: 
 
 But, if by their speculations rightly placed, the study of 
morality and the Law of Nature were brought more into fashion 
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among men of parts and genius, the discouragements that draw to 
scepticism removed, the measures of right and wrong accurately 
defined, and the principles of natural religion reduced into 
regular systems, as artfully disposed and clearly connected as 
those of some other sciences: there are grounds to think, these 
effects would not only have a gradual influence in repairing the 
too much defaced sense of virtue in the world; but also, by 
shewing, that such parts of revelation, as lie within the reach 
of human inquiry, are most agreeable to right reason, would 
dispose all prudent, unprejudiced persons, to a modest and wary 
treatment of those sacred mysteries, which are above the 
comprehension of our faculties. 
 (Works, II, Three Dialogues, “The Preface” 168-69) 
 
Finally, when imagination is governed by conscience, progress in 
aesthetics and morality will be forwarded by the structuring 
influence of a benign actuality. 
 
Daniel E. Lees 
University of Delaware 
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NOTES 
 1. Kenneth Neill Cameron notes that fundamental “changes” in 
Shelley’s epistemology “took place in 1816-1817”—the precise 
period in which he wrote and published “Mont Blanc” (157). 
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 2. The poem would have been clearer, Kapstein argues, had it 
been written “in tranquility” (1046), citing Shelley’s oft-
quoted statement from the preface to the History of a Six Weeks’ 
Tour that the poem “‘was composed under the immediate impression 
of the deep and powerful feelings excited by the objects which 
it attempts to describe . . .’” and is “‘an undisciplined 
overflowing of the soul’” (1046). Even if the remark aspires to 
be more than just a press release, it does not absolutely commit 
Shelley to a state of excitation during actual composition. 
William Keach’s study of the poem’s masterful prosody gives the 
lie to “undisciplined.” Doubtless Shelley felt strong emotion 
when viewing the mountain; but the more deeply powerful emotion 
of ontological recognition he subsequently experienced was 
clearly recollected and skillfully described in a state of 
tranquility, as I shall herein argue.  
 3. The term dualism has a number of meanings, as in the Lockean 
categories of mind and matter. In this essay I use it to mean 
two distinct minds, human and divine.  
 4. The texts of “Mont Blanc” and of Shelley’s other poems and 
of A Defence of Poetry quoted in this essay are from Reiman and 
Fraistat, hereafter cited as SPP. 
 5. Gulph, or gulf, is akin to Old English hwealf, “vault,” quite 
literally a dead end of negativity. 
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 6. After the kindly railway purser asks the character Coral 
Musker in Graham Greene’s novel Stamboul Train to “remember” 
him, she articulates a universal human yearning: “She thought 
for the first time, with happiness: perhaps I have a life in 
people’s minds when I am not there to be seen or talked to” (10, 
40).  
 7. Adverting (turning to) is so close to averting (turning 
from) that I often catch myself in a misreading. Resistance to 
divine injunction—to universing (turning to the one)—does seem 
implied, as throughout the Bible man, initially at least, often 
resists God’s commands, epitomized perhaps by that great averter 
Jonah.  
 8. Shelley’s position here has biblical support: ordinary, 
earthly priests only “serve unto the example and shadow of 
heavenly things” according to the “law” of materialism as even 
Moses began to do, until he was “admonished of God” to “make all 
things according to the pattern shewed to [him] in the mount” 
(Heb. 8:4, 5; my italics). 
 9. “Upon the whole,” Berkeley writes, I am inclined to think 
that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties 
which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way 
to knowledge, are entirely owing to our selves. That we have 
first raised a dust, and then complain, we cannot see” (Works, 
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II, Principles, “Introduction” 3). The “man of the dust of the 
ground” in Genesis (2:7) is largely myopic from the beginning.  
 10. 1 Cor. 13:12. 
 11. The “vacancy,” according to Christopher Hitt, is Shelley’s 
“key . . . to behaving ethically . . .” (150); though, 
unfortunately, he characterizes the closing rhetorical question 
as “unanswerable, ambiguous, and obscure—and perfectly 
consistent with the rest of the poem” (154)! 
 12. “. . . the law [materialism] having a shadow of good things 
to come, and not the very image of the things . . .” (Heb. 
10:1). 
 13. The Arve’s ravine presents a grotesque, semi-collapsed 
under-dome. 
 14. While a mountain furnishes a traditional symbol for a 
dualism-based aspiration of reaching up to the divine, the poem 
is all about denying any such two-way intercommunication, and 
seems impertinently conscious of the irony of its title: as has 
often been observed, Mount Blanc per se is blank, a non-
intelligent nullity reverenced in an enshrining or a mounting 
(trophy-like) of nothingness; we need to confront and sur-mount 
blankness or vacancy wherever found by seeing through this 
mountebank of a false ontology which together with its erosive 
hydraulic tributary, the Arve, declares the human mind to be 
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both preserver and destroyer. After all, one “thing” is as good 
as another to evoke an epiphany. 
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